

ALONE IN A TRUMP WORLD: THE EU AND GLOBAL PUBLIC OPINION AFTER THE US ELECTIONS

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SUMMARY

- A new survey for ECFR reveals people in many countries around the world are upbeat about the second Trump presidency.
- Many think Trump will not just be good for America but that he will bring peace or reduce tensions in Ukraine, the Middle East and US-China relations.
- In contrast, US allies in Europe and South Korea are notably pessimistic about the incoming president—suggesting a further weakening of the geopolitical “West”.
- Ukrainians are slightly more positive than not about the impact Trump might have on ending the conflict with Russia. But they are deeply conflicted about what could be an acceptable compromise settlement with Moscow.
- Europeans will struggle to find internal unity or global power in leading an outright resistance to the new administration. But the survey reveals that many in the world regard the EU as a player equal to the US and China—a strength European leaders should draw on as they enter the turbulent new presidential term.
- Rather than harking back to a post-cold war liberal order, Europeans should focus on understanding and seeing opportunities in the new world.

Trump 2.0

When Donald Trump returns to the White House, much of the world will welcome him. In Europe, anxiety is widespread, but people in many other countries feel either relaxed or actively positive about Trump's second term. This is the remarkable finding of a major new poll conducted in November 2024—directly after the US presidential election—for the European Council on Foreign Relations and Oxford University's Europe in a Changing World research project, the third in a series of [such global surveys](#).

Our poll of 28,549 people across 24 countries revealed four things. First, Europeans are almost alone in mourning Trump's election. Second, many people in other countries seem to see a Trump-led US as a “normal” great power among many in an à la carte world. Third, many also believe the president-elect is committed to ending wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. And fourth, much of the world regards Europe as more powerful than Europeans themselves do. They say the European Union is able to act on equal terms with the US and China.

To wield the influence within their grasp, Europeans need to recognise the advent of a more transactional world. Rather than [attempt to lead a global liberal opposition to Trump](#), they should understand their own strengths and deal with the world as they find it.


Trump's global welcome

In countries from India and China to Turkey and Brazil, more respondents think Trump will be good for America, for their country and for peace in the world than think he will be bad for them. Tellingly, the one exception outside Europe is South Korea—a democracy which, like most European countries, is dependent for its security on the US. In short, Trump's return is lamented by America's long-time allies but almost nobody else.

Do you think the election of Donald Trump as US president is a good or a bad thing for American citizens? In per cent

for American citizens / for peace in the world / for your country

■ Good ■ Bad ■ Neither or don't know




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Do you think the election of Donald Trump as US president is a good or a bad thing for your country? In per cent

for American citizens / for peace in the world / for your country


■ Good ■ Bad ■ Neither or don't know



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Do you think the election of Donald Trump as US president is a good or a bad thing for peace in the world? In per cent

For American citizens / For peace in the world / For your country



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Trump's welcome by a swathe of people in non-Western countries may well be driven by an enthusiasm for winners. These warm attitudes could change quickly, perhaps because of Trump's tariff policies, or if he falls short of publics' expectations around ending conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. But we think that these findings point to something more profound than the natural tendency to celebrate the victor: the publics' embrace of a much more transactional world. Rumours have circulated for some time of the liberal international order's slow death; this poll provides more evidence of its passing.


Our 2023 [survey](#) of the same countries outside Europe suggested the emergence of an "à la carte world", in which great and "middle" powers seek partners transactionally in pursuit of their own national interests. The monogamous marriages of the cold war period are now

history and middle powers have embraced polyamorous relationships, favouring different partners for different issues.

The weakening of the West is visible in its dramatic failure to isolate Moscow globally after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. Many countries exhibit a remarkably strong acceptance of Russia as an ally or necessary partner, despite nearly three years of Russia waging a brutal neocolonial war in Ukraine. The number of Indians and Chinese who consider Russia to be their country's ally has even marginally grown since January 2023. Average American opinion of Russia has also improved, even if a majority continues to see Russia as either a rival or an adversary.

Generally speaking, thinking about Russia, which of the following best reflects your view on what it is to your country? In per cent

- An ally – that shares our interests and values
- A necessary partner – with which we must strategically cooperate
- Don't know or no answer
- A rival – with which we need to compete
- An adversary – with which we are in conflict




In the EU countries, the question asked concerned Russia's relationship to the EU.

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And in a number of non-Western countries—China, India, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey—most people expect Russia's global influence to grow in the next decade; this is also the view of nearly half of the population in Brazil and Indonesia. In short, it seems that it is losing wars rather than starting them that damages your standing with public opinion in much of the world.

Do you think Russia will have more or less global influence over the next decade, as compared to today, or will its influence remain unchanged? In per cent

- Much more or somewhat more global influence
- No change – it has global influence now, and still will
- Don't know or no answer
- No change – it does not have global influence now, and still will not
- Much less or somewhat less global influence



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At the same time, Russians and Chinese are much more united in their mutual appreciation than Europeans and Americans. The perception of Russia in China has strengthened marginally since the end of 2022, but so has the perception of China in Russia. This makes this couple a rare “entente cordiale” in today’s global politics.

Generally speaking, thinking about Russia, which of the following best reflects your view on what it is to your country? In per cent

- An ally – that shares our interests and values
- A necessary partner – with which we must strategically cooperate
- Don't know or no answer
- A rival – with which we need to compete
- An adversary – with which we are in conflict


China




India




Turkey



US



EU9



In the EU, the question asked concerned Russia's relationship to the EU. The displayed results correspond to a simple average across nine EU countries: Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Spain.

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Generally speaking, thinking about each country or entity, which of the following best reflects your view on what it is to your country? In per cent

- An ally – that shares our interests and values
- A necessary partner – with which we must strategically cooperate
- Don't know or no answer
- A rival – with which we need to compete
- An adversary – with which we are in conflict

Chinese view of Russia



Russian view of China




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By contrast, in the “Western alliance”, just one in five Europeans say they view the US as an ally. This is down significantly from two years ago, and is half the proportion of Americans who view the EU as an ally. Indeed, the number of Americans who see the EU as an ally (a prevailing view) has remained steady, and the share of those who regard it as a necessary partner has grown from a quarter to a third.

Generally speaking, thinking about each country or entity, which of the following best reflects your view on what it is to your country? In per cent

- An ally – that shares our interests and values
- A necessary partner – with which we must strategically cooperate
- Don't know or no answer
- A rival – with which we need to compete
- An adversary – with which we are in conflict

European view* of the US



American view of the EU



*European view is based on a simple average across the results from nine EU countries included in both rounds of polling.

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We identified five “tendencies” for how people view Trump’s return. The first are the **Trump Welcomers**. They view Trump’s election victory as good for Americans and for peace in the world. This attitude is widespread in India and Saudi Arabia, but also popular in Russia, South Africa, China and Brazil. Most Trump Welcomers also see the incoming president as good for their own country.

At the other extreme are the **Never Trumpers**—those who see his victory as bad for Americans and for peace in the world. The Never Trumpers are a very rare breed globally, and they are concentrated in Europe—notably the United Kingdom, where they constitute half the public. They often represent the progressive opponents of Trump (not just in Europe but also in Brazil, South Korea and Turkey). Most Never Trumpers also regard Trump’s return to the presidency as bad for their own country.


The three other tendencies represent more nuanced views of Trump’s potential impact on global politics.

Some regard Trump as better for peace in the world than for American citizens. In other words, they doubt that Trump is good for Americans, but they see his election as an opportunity to bring current conflicts to an end. We call them the **Peace-seekers**. They are particularly numerous in China, but are also a sizeable group in Switzerland and Ukraine (a special case, which we discuss further below).

The fourth tendency consists of those who believe Trump's election is worse for peace in the world than it is for American citizens. They often live in places that may be endangered by the United States' withdrawal from a more activist global role. Half of South Koreans belong to this tendency. But such a standpoint can also be discerned in Turkey, Indonesia, South Africa, Brazil and Ukraine. Many of them are ideologically on the right of the political spectrum—but they seem to be pessimistic about the likely effects of Trump's foreign policy. In that sense, they may be described as the **Conflicted**.

The last are the **Uncertains**, who are reserving judgment about what Trump means for American citizens or for world peace. They do not commit on these two questions. This “wait and see” attitude is commonest in Ukraine and Russia—two countries that have good reason to avoid drawing premature conclusions about Trump.

Global views of what Trump’s return heralds for the world. As share of national population, in per cent



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These attitudes may reflect a big change in the understanding of the United States’ global role. Under Trump, America will no longer aim to spread its values and act as a global defender of the liberal international order. The broad global welcome to Trump could herald the end of the US as a “liberal leviathan”, to recall John Ikenberry’s striking phrase.


The United States as a “normal” great power

Many in the non-Western world may view Trump’s victory as good news. But they do not see it as the start of “Making America Great Again”. They expect China to be at least as competitive.

The poll demonstrates that most people around the world see America as a continuing superpower or as one whose influence could still grow.

Do you think the US will have more or less global influence over the next decade, as compared to today, or will its influence remain unchanged? In per cent


- Much more or somewhat more global influence
- No change – it has global influence now, and still will
- Don't know or no answer
- No change – it does not have global influence now, and still will not
- Much less or somewhat less global influence



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However, people expect China—rather than America—to become the world’s strongest power. Majorities hold this view everywhere except for Ukraine, South Korea, India and America itself. Even in the US, as many people say China will become the strongest country as those who say it will not.

Looking ahead, how likely do you think it is that in the next 20 years China will be the strongest power in the world – stronger than the United States? In per cent




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Surprisingly, despite the cross-party consensus in the US on the strategic threat from China, most Americans believe their country’s relations with China will either stay unchanged or actually improve in the next five years. Chinese people too are hopeful that bilateral relations will remain steady or get better. Yet more surprisingly, perhaps, the prevailing view in both the US and China is that Trump’s arrival could well ease tensions. But there is a more negative view of the US in China—around half of Chinese view America as either a rival or an adversary. In contrast, only just over one-third of Americans hold a corresponding view about China.

How do you expect your country's relationship with the other country to change over the next five years? US and Chinese opinion, in per cent


- I expect relations to become stronger
- I expect relations to get weaker
- I expect relations to remain unchanged
- Don't know or no answer



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Generally speaking, do you think reducing the tensions between the United States and China will be more or less likely now that Trump is US president, or will it make no difference? In per cent


- More likely
- Less likely
- No difference or don't know



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Generally speaking, thinking about each country, which of the following best reflects your view on what it is to your country? US and Chinese opinion, in per cent

- An ally – that shares our interests and values
- A necessary partner – with which we must strategically cooperate
- Don't know or no answer
- A rival – with which we need to compete
- An adversary – with which we are in conflict



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The globally anticipated rise of China suggests Trump’s return comes as US geopolitical exceptionalism is beginning to recede. People may reasonably believe his foreign policy to be geared towards the national interest above all else. If the president executes this policy as expected, it would mean his country behaving as a more “normal” great power—one more like the other great and middle powers of today (except the EU!), and more like great powers in earlier periods of history.


Biden’s wars versus Trump’s promise of peace

Ending the war in Ukraine “in 24 hours” was one of Trump’s election promises. He has made similar bold claims about conflict in the Middle East. What do people in different parts of the world make of his chances?

In most countries surveyed, the largest share of public opinion holds Trump to be a peacemaker. Many—especially in India, Saudi Arabia, Russia, China, South Africa and the US itself—expect his administration to bring current conflicts to an end. However, fewer share this view in Europe and South Korea.

Generally speaking, do you think achieving peace in Ukraine will be more or less likely now that Donald Trump is US president, or will it make no difference? In per cent


Peace in Ukraine / Peace in the Middle East



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Generally speaking, do you think achieving peace in the Middle East will be more or less likely now that Donald Trump is US president, or will it make no difference? In per cent


Peace in Ukraine / Peace in the Middle East



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Trump’s peacemaker reputation matters because of the way America is seen as closely tied to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. In countries as diverse as China, India and Turkey, significant numbers view the conflicts as part of a broader face-off between the West and Russia, or between democracies and autocracies.

How would you describe the war in Ukraine? Share of the public agreeing 'a great deal' or 'a fair amount' with the following descriptions, in per cent




	A war between two neighbouring countries, Russia and Ukraine	A war between the West and Russia	A war between democracies and autocracies
Brazil	59	41	49
China	73	72	69
Indonesia	56	47	38
India	66	64	59
South Korea	66	45	47
Russia	65	70	53
Saudi Arabia	74	58	57
Turkey	60	60	51
US	70	48	58
South Africa	67	50	58
Switzerland	66	48	43
UK	78	49	53
Ukraine	76	45	65
EU11	69	49	46

The third option was phrased as "A war between two different systems of government" in Russia, China, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

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How would you describe the war in Gaza? Share of the public agreeing 'a great deal' or 'a fair amount' with the following descriptions, in per cent



	A war between Israel and Palestinian armed groups	A war between the US and Iran	Part of a confrontation between Western and non-Western countries
Brazil	65	45	41
China	76	71	68
Indonesia	55	44	41
India	62	62	53
South Korea	64	42	33
Russia	70	55	52
Saudi Arabia	67	47	50
Turkey	54	46	55
US	69	41	42
South Africa	67	49	53
Switzerland	67	27	33
UK	68	21	29
EU11	67	30	32


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Outside Russia and China, few people globally believe that only Ukraine is responsible for the war continuing, or that it is more responsible for this than Russia. But—handily for Putin—many people in major non-Western powers (especially in India, Indonesia, China and Saudi Arabia) consider Russia and Ukraine to be equally responsible for the war continuing. This starting point could boost support in such countries for forcing Ukraine to make major concessions to reach a compromise settlement.

Such a settlement is the outcome that people everywhere (except for Russia) already see as the most likely.

Thinking only of Russia and Ukraine, which of these two sides in your view is more responsible for the war in Ukraine continuing? In per cent


- Out of the two, only Russia is responsible
- Russia is more responsible, although Ukraine has some responsibility
- Both Russia and Ukraine are equally responsible
- Ukraine is more responsible, although Russia has some responsibility
- Out of the two, only Ukraine is responsible
- Neither of these is responsible
- Don't know or no response



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Which of these potential outcomes of the war in Ukraine do you think is the most likely? In per cent

- Ukraine winning the war
- Ukraine and Russia reaching a compromise settlement
- Russia winning the war
- None of these, don't know or no response




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A humiliating peace is clearly not the preference of Ukraine’s Western allies. Roughly one-third of those asked in the US and the UK, and a quarter in the EU, continue to express support for Ukraine to win outright, including to recover the territories currently occupied by Russia. Another quarter in the EU, the UK and the US would favour a peace deal that involves Ukraine being offered NATO membership. Such an outcome could be seen as a Ukrainian victory—and certainly as a compromise very favourable for Ukraine and unfavourable for Russia.

Which of the following best reflects your view on what the US/Europe should do about the war in Ukraine more broadly? In per cent

- The US/Europe should support Ukraine in continuing fighting to win back territories occupied by Russia
- The US/Europe should push Ukraine towards negotiating a peace deal with Russia, with a prior offer of NATO membership for Ukraine
- The US/Europe should push Ukraine towards negotiating a peace deal with Russia, without a prior offer of NATO membership for Ukraine
- None of these, don't know or no answer



Respondents in the US were asked about the US; all others were asked about Europe.

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What is really new is the evolution of opinion in Ukraine itself. In just half a year, the expectation of victory has plummeted from well over half those asked in May 2024 to barely more than one-third by November the same year. Most Ukrainians now say they expect a compromise settlement.

Which of these potential outcomes of the war in Ukraine do you think is the most likely? Ukrainian opinion, in per cent



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As we have seen earlier, slightly more people in Ukraine believe that peace is likelier under Trump than think it is less likely.

But those Ukrainians who think Trump's return makes peace likelier do not necessarily agree on how the war will end—and, therefore, what sort of peace is under discussion. One-third of them (corresponding to just over one in ten Ukrainians) expect Ukraine to win the war. They may hope Trump will give Ukraine the increased and bolder military support that they became increasingly frustrated at not receiving from the Biden administration. Still, most of this group (corresponding to one in five Ukrainians) expect the war to end in a compromise settlement. They may have accepted the impossibility of recovering all the territory within the 1991 borders for the foreseeable future. But they might have maintained hope that the territory the Ukrainian government still controls could join Western institutions, with both EU membership and either NATO membership or NATO-like security commitments from a European coalition of the willing.

However, there is no consensus in Ukrainian society on the nature of an acceptable compromise. Such disagreements could stoke political turmoil if and when negotiations begin.

If your government was offered the following prospects, would you support this? Ukrainian opinion, in per cent

■ Definitely yes
 ■ Probably yes
 ■ Don't know
 ■ Probably not
 ■ Definitely not

EU membership with its security guarantees, but not NATO membership, in exchange for agreeing not to continue fighting to recover occupied territory



Both EU and NATO membership, with their security guarantees for the territories that it currently controls, in exchange for agreeing not to continue fighting to recover occupied territory



Regaining all its occupied territory in the 1991 borders, in exchange for agreeing to become a neutral country that cannot join the alliances like the EU and NATO



Regaining all its occupied territory in the 1991 borders, in exchange for agreeing not to join NATO (but still being able to join the EU)



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A new strategy for Europe in a transactional world

Remembering Trump’s first term, some Europeans still fondly imagine themselves aligning with many other countries around the world in their alarm at his return to the White House. This time, however, Europeans are almost alone in their scepticism of Trump, in contrast to opinion elsewhere in the world.

While global perceptions of the US as an enduring superpower remain largely unaltered, what has changed significantly is America’s expected positioning in the international system. In our [poll](#) carried out in late 2022—with the Biden administration standing shoulder to shoulder with Europe in outrage at Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—it was still possible to discern a “united West”—although one already clearly “divided from the Rest” in response to that conflict.

With Trump's return, however, the West is divided. Divisions run not just between the US and Europe (and other US allies such as South Korea) but also inside the EU, as a forthcoming ECFR polling report will demonstrate. All European countries are divided internally on Trump's return—and several south-eastern European countries among the 11 EU member states in our survey stand out for their more welcoming attitudes. Indeed, it may no longer be possible to speak of “the West” as a single geopolitical actor.


The big challenge for Europeans is therefore to find their own place in a more à la carte, zero-sum world. European leaders would not just be wrong to believe that Trump's victory will necessarily bring Europeans together. Any attempt by the EU to achieve unity in direct opposition to Trump could lead to major divisions both between and within the member states.

However, this survey identifies three trends that could help guide European decision-makers during the second Trump presidency.

First, the poll shows that Europeans are aware of their distinctive interests when it comes to relations with the US, but also with other powers. They view the US as the EU's main friend and Russia as its main enemy, and they still broadly consider others—Turkey, China and India—to be necessary partners for the EU.

Generally speaking, thinking about each country or entity, which of the following best reflects your view on what it is to the EU? EU opinion, in per cent

- An ally – that shares our interests and values
- A necessary partner – with which we must strategically cooperate
- Don't know
- A rival – with which we need to compete
- An adversary – with which we are in conflict




Average across 11 EU countries polled.

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Second, people around the world see the EU as a major global power. Majorities in most countries consider the bloc capable of dealing on equal terms with the US and China. Ironically enough, the people who believe least in European power are the Europeans themselves, including the British and the Swiss.

Which of the following best reflects your view on the EU's global standing? In per cent

■ The EU is a power that can deal on equal terms with global powers, such as the US or China
 ■ The EU is not a power that can deal on equal terms with global powers, such as the US or China
 ■ Don't know or no answer




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What is more, while Europe is uniquely challenged in a Trumpian, transactional world, many expect the EU's global influence to grow or at least remain as strong as today. Again, people in Europe are often more disbelieving on this point than citizens elsewhere.

Do you think the EU will have more or less global influence over the next decade, as compared to today, or will its influence remain unchanged? In per cent

- Much more or somewhat more global influence
- No change – it has global influence now, and still will
- Don't know or no answer
- No change – it does not have global influence now, and still will not
- Much less or somewhat less global influence




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Third, the poll highlights several potential partnerships for Europeans. In countries such as Brazil, India and South Africa, people broadly see the EU as both powerful and as an ally or a partner. The recent EU-Mercosur trade agreement shows the kind of deals that a more united EU could make.

Generally speaking, thinking about the EU, which of the following best reflects your view on what it is to your country? In per cent

- An ally – that shares our interests and values
- A necessary partner – with which we must strategically cooperate
- Don't know or no answer
- A rival – with which we need to compete
- An adversary – with which we are in conflict



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There is also significant potential for strategic partnering between the EU and the UK, especially when it comes to the war in Ukraine and European security; and with Turkey, especially when it comes to the Middle East.

As this poll shows, in its attitudes and priorities, the UK remains a European country. Another [recent ECFR poll](#) also showed clearly that citizens in both the UK and the EU favour a closer relationship, faced with the threat of Putin and the challenge of Trump.

Turkey—a very popular middle power (most other countries surveyed regard it chiefly as a partner)—is another country where seeking a more effective partnership should, in our view, become one of the EU's most urgent priorities. Ankara is not an easy partner for Brussels, but

a rapprochement could boost the EU's influence in shaping the new Middle East order, beneficially influence the expected Russia-Ukraine negotiations, and strengthen the bloc's influence in Africa.

What the EU must do to be taken seriously by Trump's White House closely resembles what it must do to make friends and influence people globally. Rather than posing as a moral arbiter of everyone else's behaviour, Europe should build its domestic strength and seek new bilateral partnerships to defend its own values and interests in a transactional world.

Methodology

This report is based on a public opinion poll of adult populations (aged 18 and over) conducted in November 2024 in 16 European countries (Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom), and eight non-European countries (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea and the United States). The total number of respondents was 28,549.

In Russia, Turkey and all countries outside Europe the polls were conducted by Gallup International Association through a network of independent local partners and cross-country panel operators as an online survey in: Brazil (1,000; 18-25 November; through MarketAnalysis); China (1,005 respondents; 12-21 November; through Distance/Dynata); Indonesia (1,000; 15-20 November; through DEKA); Russia (1,000; 14-25 November; through Be Media Consultant); Saudi Arabia (1,002; 13-22 November; through Distance/Dynata); South Africa (1,010; 12-21 November; through Distance/Dynata); South Korea (1,000; 13-17 November; through Gallup Korea); Turkey (1,005; 12-21 November; through Distance/Dynata); and the US (1,012; 15 November; through Distance/Survey Monkey). The method in India was the face-to-face survey (1,008; 20 November-4 December; through Convergent). The choice of face-to-face surveys in India was directed by the poor quality of internet in India's smaller cities.

In Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey and the US the sample was nationally representative of basic demographics. In China, the poll included panellists only from the country's four biggest agglomerations: Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai and Shenzhen. In India, rural areas and tier-3 cities were not covered. And in Russia, only cities of at least 100,000 inhabitants were covered. Therefore, data from China, India and Russia should be considered as representative only for the population covered by the poll. Besides, considering a politically sensitive character of several questions, the results from China, Russia and Saudi Arabia need to be interpreted with caution, bearing in mind the possibility

that some respondents might have felt constrained in expressing their opinions freely.

In the remaining European countries, the polls were conducted online by Datapraxis and YouGov in Bulgaria (1,014; 7-29 November); Denmark (1,099; 7-26 November); France (2,017; 7 November - 2 December); Germany (2,003; 7-28 November); Hungary (1,023; 7-28 November); Italy (1,531; 7-29 November); Poland (1,063; 7-29 November); Portugal (1,000; 7-27 November); Romania (1,010; 7-26 November); Spain (1,030; 7-27 November); Switzerland (1,082; 8-26 November), and the UK (2,073; 7-26 November). Polls were conducted by Datapraxis and Norstat in Estonia (1,061; 11 November-5 December). In Ukraine, polls were conducted by DataPraxis and Rating Group in Ukraine (1,501; 15-20 November) via telephone interviews (CATI), with respondents selected using randomly generated telephone numbers. The data was then weighted to basic demographics. Fully accounting for the population changes due to the war is difficult, but adjustments have been made to account for the territory under Russian occupation. This, combined with the probability-based sampling approach, strengthens the level of representativeness of the survey and generally reflects the attitudes of Ukrainian public opinion in wartime conditions.

In this policy brief, and unless stated otherwise, the results for “the EU” correspond to a simple average across 11 EU member states within the sample (ie, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Spain).

The segmentation into different “attitudes towards Trump” used in this paper is based on responses to two questions: “Do you think the election of Donald Trump as president of the US is a good or bad thing for American citizens?” and “Do you think the election of Donald Trump as president of the US is a good or bad thing for peace in the world?” For each of these questions, available options included: “very good thing”, “rather good thing”, “neither good nor bad thing”, “rather bad thing”, “very bad thing”, and “don’t know”. Respondents were put into five different categories based on the following criteria:

- “Trump welcomers”—if they chose “very good thing” or “rather good thing” to each of the questions;
- “Never Trumpers”—if they chose “very bad thing” or “rather bad thing” to each of the questions;
- “Uncertains”—if they chose “neither good nor bad thing” to each of the questions;
- “Peace seekers—if they chose “very good thing” or “rather good thing” on what Trump represents for peace in the world, while choosing “very bad thing”, “rather bad thing”,

or “neither good nor bad thing” on what he means for the American citizens; or if they chose “neither good nor bad thing” on what he represents for peace in the world, while choosing “very bad thing” or “rather bad thing” on what he means for American citizens;

- “The conflicted”—if they chose “very good thing” or “rather good thing” on what Trump represents for American citizens, while choosing “very bad thing”, “rather bad thing”, or “neither good nor bad thing” on what he means for peace in the world; or if they chose “neither good nor bad thing” on what he represents for American citizens, while choosing “very bad thing” or “rather bad thing” on what he means for peace in the world.

The remaining respondents—who chose “Don’t know” to at least one of the two questions—were not put into any of these five categories, being instead considered as “The rest”.

The table below provides a graphical representation of the above-mentioned segmentation.

		Trump for American citizens →			
		Good	Neutral	Bad	Don't know
Trump for peace in the world ↓	Good	Trump Welcomers	Peace-seekers	Peace-seekers	The rest
	Neutral	Conflicted	Uncertains	Peace-seekers	The rest
	Bad	Conflicted	Conflicted	Never Trumpers	The rest
	Don't know	The rest	The rest	The rest	The rest

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